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Abstract
We experimentally study the emergence of networks under a known external threat. To be more
specific, we deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe
and efficient networks while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. This
investigation relates theoretical predictions by Dziubiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour.
Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions
for the equilibrium network. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decisionmaking process was elicited and analysed. We find that while subjects are able to build safe networks
in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other
treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not efficient. Additionally, we find that
farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build
safe or efficient networks.
Keywords: Networks Experiment Network Design Network Defence Network Disruption
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1

Introduction

Networks are ubiquitous in all fields of society and economy: Companies depend crucially on transportation
and distribution networks whereas social relations and companies depend on communication or information
networks. Being a member of such an interconnected system often proves to be beneficial. For example,
companies profit from networks in the form of supply chains due to the possibility to create and maintain
competitive advantages (Pelliccia, 2015). Among others a network’s benefit depends on the network structure
and the associated costs. The more players in the network, the more each player can potentially benefit from
the connections. However, before benefiting from it, one first has to invest in building and maintaining links
within the network, which demands time and effort (Morbitzer et al, 2012). Next to its structure, the benefit
of a network is also influenced by its reliability. Thus, if the network is easily destroyable, it might not be
worth to invest in being part of the network. To guarantee the reliability of the network, the network itself
must withstand attacks on its components. For example, attacks can happen as faults of the structure of
the network itself, disturbances via individuals within the network, or external strategic or random attacks.
Random attacks are often found in epidemiology (Cerdeiro et al, 2015) or in climatology in the form of
natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes. Strategic attacks can target information, communication
or financial networks (Haller, 2016), for example, and can be conducted in the form of intelligent human
attacks such as terrorist attempts (Arce et al, 2012).
Attacks can be targeted at the nodes of the network or at its links and, thus, can have severe consequences
on the functioning of the network: Especially in complex network structures there exist inevitably specific
nodes or links which are essential for the network to work. Attacks on these targets are often sufficient to
disconnect the whole network (Kovenock and Roberson, 2015). An example for critical nodes in networks
are servers which are threatened by viruses and cyber-attacks (Goyal et al, 2016). Critical link targets are
trade-paths between countries (Pelliccia, 2015), the wires of power grids or the pipes of oil systems, for
example. In all cases, an attack might affect the connectivity of the whole network.
In economics, network disruption has so far mainly been analysed in the context of its effect on network
formation. Thus, the main question is how the threat of an attack will influence the initial formation of
the network. This work deals with this question by building on the theoretical work on strategic network
formation, which, in economics, has been founded by the seminal papers of Bala and Goyal (2000) and
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). The streams of models based on these basic network formation models
analyse the influence of the threat of disruption on network formation and can be split into research about
attacks on the links of the network (see, e.g., Bravard et al 2017, Hoyer and De Jaegher 2016 or Haller 2016)
and research about attacks on the nodes of the network (see, e.g., Dziubiński and Goyal 2013, Dziubiński and
Goyal 2017, Goyal and Vigier 2014, Cerdeiro et al 2015, Pelliccia 2015, or Kovenock and Roberson 2015).
Additionally, Hoyer and De Jaegher (2012) analyse both link and node disruption in a decentralized model
of network formation, where the nodes themselves decide on links, and compare the results.
While this theoretical literature on network formation and the influence of disruption on the formation
process is growing, there are only relatively few papers that address pure network formation models experimentally. Experiments on pure network formation building on the model by Bala and Goyal (2000) are
Callander and Plott (2005), Falk and Kosfeld (2012), and Goeree et al (2009), for example. Using the model
of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) as a basis, the laboratory experiment by Kirchsteiger et al (2016), sets its
focus on analysing the impact of farsightedness on the ability to reach theoretically predicted stable networks.
The experimental research on network formation models mostly confirms the theoretical findings identifying
the star, the wheel or the empty network as stable and efficient networks. The only two papers we are aware
of that investigate the influence of network disruption in an experiment are Hoyer and Rosenkranz (2015)
and Goyal et al (2016). Hoyer and Rosenkranz (2015) test the link disruption introduced in the decentralized
model of Hoyer and De Jaegher (2012) in the laboratory. They find that in the treatment with a disruptor,
subjects reach the circle network that is the highest paying equilibrium network less often than it would be
expected. Goyal et al (2016) conduct a field experiment in which the participants had to choose which other
participant to build a link to. They find that under decentralized network formation and network defence
facing the threat of contagion from node attacks, the participants form a dense network characterized by
centre-protected stars. While using different methods (laboratory vs. field experiment), both of these papers
test a model of decentralized network formation under the threat of disruption.
In opposition to this, we use the model by Dziubiński and Goyal (2013) as a theoretical foundation for this
experiment, which is a centralized model of network formation under the threat of node attacks. To the best
of our knowledge, there is no other experiment that follows this approach. The theoretical model has clear
predictions of the equilibrium network depending on the cost ranges of link formation and node protection.
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For rather low costs of link formation and rather high costs of node protection, the equilibrium network is
a densely connected network with no protected nodes, whereas for rather low costs of node protection, the
equilibrium network is a centre-protected star. While the theory has very clear predictions, what it cannot
deliver is showing whether network designers are actually able to reach these networks by building the most
efficient networks for different cost levels. Besides this, it gives no indication about the influence of the initial
starting network on the network formation process.
We therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks under a known external threat. To be
more specific, we deal with the question if subjects are able to form safe and efficient networks while facing
a strategic Adversary. This investigation relates theoretical predictions proposed by Dziubiński and Goyal
(2013) to actual observed behaviour. Our main objective is to analyse what kind of networks emerge under
an external threat and to investigate if subjects are able to build safe and efficient networks. Additionally,
subjects face different starting networks, so we can analyse whether the equilibrium networks may be reached
from any starting network. Besides investigating the network formation behaviour, we also analyse whether
the subjects are able to cause a network disruption by finding and attacking weak spots in the network.
Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process is investigated.
We find that while in both treatments subjects manage to build predominantly safe networks, efficient
networks are built in only one of the two treatments. Furthermore, we find that there is no influence of the
starting network on their ability to design safe and efficient networks. Farsightedness –as measured in our
experiment– has no influence on subjects’ decisions to build safe and efficient networks. However, experience
seems to be important, as those students who had experience in any form with network theory before the
experiment performed significantly better than their unexperienced counterparts.
The paper is structured as follows: First we describe the experimental set-up including a short review of
the underlying theoretical model. Afterwards, we describe the research hypotheses in Section 2. Then we
present and discuss the experimental results in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 provides the conclusion.

2
2.1

Experiment
Experimental Design

The theoretical foundation for this experimental analysis is the model of Dziubiński and Goyal (2013).
They investigate network formation and disruption by means of node attacks. Their model comprises a
sequential-move game in which a Designer first designs a network by building links and allocating perfect
defence resources to the nodes knowing about the threat of an attack. Subsequently, an Adversary who has
perfect knowledge about the Designer’s decisions chooses a number of nodes to attack, whereas his attack
budget is exogenously specified. The final network after the attack is called the residual network. The model
provides insights into preferable network structures given costly links and defence units and a threatening
attack: Dziubiński and Goyal (2013) find that for low costs of defence relative to linking, the protection
in the network is centralized, the network is sparse, and linking is heterogeneous. For the case of high
protection costs relative to linking, the network is dense and linking is homogeneous. In Appendix A we
briefly present a formal summary of this model in an already slightly adapted version to our experimental
design. In our experimental design we consider networks with n = 8 nodes and up to two possible attacks
ka = 2 by the Adversary. Due to this relatively high number of nodes, the Designer has many possibilities
to design the network. Moreover, it impedes the task insofar that the defence and attack strategies have
to be more thoroughly thought through, which reduces the chance of building equilibrium networks out of
random link settings.
The network experiment consists of two phases in which two players –the Designer and the Adversary–
act sequentially. We randomly match all subjects in groups of two persons for the whole experiment. In
Phase I, the Designer is shown four initial starting networks. The Designer designs his networks by setting
links and by protecting nodes at cost c` > 0 and cd > 0. He builds his networks knowing that the Adversary
sees all his formation and protection decisions after Phase I and is allowed to target up to two nodes of each
of his networks afterwards. In order to maximize his payoff, the Designer designs the networks to ensure
connectivity even after the attacks. Every connected network has the value of vD > 0 Taler for the Designer,
from which the costs for links and defence are deducted. Any network that is no longer connected after an
attack is worth zero to the Designer (and costs of link formation and protection are ignored). Furthermore,
a network is also worth zero to the Designer if he uses all his budget of vD Taler for the network formation
process. Within the experiment, the respective changes in the architecture as well as the potential payoff
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Phase I (15 minutes):

Phase II (5 minutes):

Each subject in the role of the
Designer

Each subject in the role of the
Adversary

• is presented four initial networks,

-

• may choose links to establish,

• is presented networks designed by a
randomly chosen other subject,
• may select nodes to attack.

• may select nodes to protect,
• is informed about the (potential) payoff of the networks.

Residual Networks and Payoffs:

-

Each subject sees the residual networks and final payoffs resulting from the
decisions in the role of the Designer and of the Adversary.

Figure 1: Experimental Design

of the residual network (if it resists the attack of the Adversary) are instantly displayed. For building the
networks in Phase I, the Designer has a time restriction of 15 minutes.1
There is a vast number of possibilities how the Designer may build a protected network for the given set
of nodes. Figure 2 shows some examples for our context with n = 8 nodes. In Figure 2(a), the network is an
example for a k-connected network with k = 3. This means if any set of nodes up to size k − 1 is taken out
of the network, the residual network is still connected. This k-connected network is also an example for a
minimal k-connected network as it has a minimal number of links required for k-connectedness.2 Figure 2(b)
depicts a star with a protected central node linked to any other node by one link. The third network is the
empty network containing no links at all, shown in Figure 2(c).

(a) 3-connected network

(b) centre-protected star network

(c) empty network

Figure 2: Examples for Equilibrium Networks with n = 8
The three networks in Figure 2 are of particular importance since exactly these three types of networks
actually occur in equilibrium.3 According to the theoretical model, we define two treatments which can be
distinguished by their predicted equilibrium network. More precisely, once the other parameters are fixed,
we vary the costs of node protection across the two treatments. Generally, we assume the values of the
network to be vD = 100 for the Designer and vA = 20 for the Adversary. In addition, we set the costs of
linking to c` = 5 and the costs of node protection to cd = 20 for treatment T1 and to cd = 30 and c` = 5
for treatment T2. Table 1 summarizes the treatments.
Treatment
T1
T2

n
8
8

Parameters
ka vD vA c`
2 100 20 5
2 100 20 5

Equilibrium Network
cd
20
30

centre-protected star network
minimal 3-connected network

Table 1: Treatment Summary
1 Some preliminary tests have proven this to be an appropriate time restriction. In addition, each subject may individually
decide to have finished Phase I earlier and enter into a waiting screen.
2 For further details on (minimal) k-connectedness see Dziubiński and Goyal (2013).
3 The according restrictions on the parameters for each network can be found in Appendix A.
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For the experiment, we choose to use four initial starting networks, which differ in the placement of the
nodes as well as in the initially established links. This allows us to investigate whether the Designer develops
an efficient network by following a strategy or has a lucky guess. The position of the starting networks on
the screen is arranged randomly per pair of players to avoid any biases through the visual sequence of the
networks. Thus, the initial networks are presented to the Designers simultaneously and in random order.
Similarly, in Phase II, the Adversary also sees the four designed networks in the same random order and is
asked to attack all four of them. This allows us to analyse whether the Adversary is able to strategically
attack the networks or if he just randomly picks his targets among the nodes. The initial networks are shown
schematically in Figure 3.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 3: Initial Starting Networks
The initial networks in Phase I consist of the empty network as shown in Figure 3(a) and three other
networks as depicted in Figure 3(b) to Figure 3(d). We include the empty network to allow the subjects
to freely build links and protect nodes. In each of the other three networks in Figure 3(b) to Figure 3(d),
three links are already given and cannot be modified by the subject. However, the costs for the initial links
still need to be paid by the Designer. These already included links keep the subjects from simply copying
the links they decided on in the empty network to the other presented networks and therefore it requires
additional strategic thinking from the subjects. The nodes in Figure 3(a) and Figure 3(b) are displayed in
a symmetric array, while in Figure 3(c) and Figure 3(d) there is no particular visible pattern. All networks
are shown at the same time on one single screen, which makes it possible for the participants to go back
to an already designed network to improve its design and use the experience gained by forming the other
networks. Figure 4 shows examples for the equilibrium networks for treatment T1 and Figure 5 those for
treatment T2.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 4: Examples for Equilibrium Networks for Treatment T1

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 5: Examples for Equilibrium Networks for Treatment T2
We provide monetary incentives for the experiment for which the value of the residual network after
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the attacks is payoff-relevant.4 The only modification we make is that once a Designer has spent more for
links and node protection than the value of the network, a warning is displayed and the payoff is set to
zero. The participants know that they only get paid for two of the eight networks they worked on: The first
network the subjects get paid for is one of the four networks they designed. Therefore, their payoff depends
on the connectivity of the network after Phase II, since the potential payoff for a connected network is 100
Taler less the costs for linking and protection, and 0 Taler for a disconnected one. The second network they
get paid for is one of the four networks they attacked. They earn 20 Taler if the network they attacked is
disconnected after Phase II. Their payoff is irrespective of the fact whether the network was already designed
in a disconnected manner or whether the network got separated following their attack. For a network which
is still connected after the attack, they earn 0 Taler. The complete instructions for the main experiment can
be found in Appendix D.1.
Furthermore, the participants’ cognitive abilities may matter in the process of finding an equilibrium
network. Therefore, we conducted an additional experiment within the questionnaire after the main network
formation experiment was finished. This extra experiment addresses the participants’ cognitive abilities by
using an adaptation of the “11-20 Money Request Game (MRG)” by Arad and Rubinstein (2012). This game
tests the subjects’ depth of reasoning and gives us a measure for their farsightedness. A detailed description
of the game can be found in Appendix C and the additional instructions for the subjects in Appendix D.2.

2.2

Research Hypotheses

The following three hypotheses affect the Designer’s network formation behaviour and deal with the equilibrium predictions of the network experiment: Due to the fact that the Designers know about the threat
of the subsequent attack, it is generally assumed that they adjust their network formation behaviour to
account for this threat. Moreover, since they are even aware of the number of attacks, it is also assumed
that the participants are able to form networks which can withstand all of the Adversary’s attacks without
being disconnected. Summarizing, we expect that the Designers build networks which are safe concerning
the Adversaries’ attacks. This assumption about the Designers’ ability to form safe networks shapes our
first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 Independently of the treatment, a significant share of Designers builds safe networks for each
initial network.
According to the theory, the designed networks are expected to be the predicted equilibrium networks.
Since the equilibrium networks are also safe networks, it is implied that a significant share of the designed safe
networks are equilibrium networks. This means for treatment T1 that a significant share of safe networks
consists of a centre-protected star network and for treatment T2 that a significant share of safe networks
consists of the minimal 3-connected network without defence. Both equilibrium networks are efficient, which
means that the payoff for the residual network is maximized given the costs of links and node defence. This
definition enables us to differentiate between safe networks and safe networks built with minimal costs –thus
networks that are safe and efficient. Consequentially, our second hypothesis directly distinguishes between
the emergence of safe, and safe and efficient equilibrium networks.
Hypothesis 2 Among the safe networks per starting network,
a) In treatment T1, a centre-protected star network is designed significantly more often than others.
b) In treatment T2, a minimal 3-connected network without defence is designed significantly more often
than others.
The next hypothesis aims at the Designer’s personal characteristics and augments the theoretical predictions: Farsightedness might influence the Designer’s behaviour. Since forming efficient networks –which
cannot be destroyed by the Adversary’s two attacks and which at the same time are cost minimal– requires
thinking several steps ahead, we conjecture that the Designer’s degree of farsightedness plays a role in finding
the equilibrium networks. So, Designers are expected to consider the vulnerabilities of their formed networks
and take the Adversary’s behaviour into account, too. Accordingly, we conjecture that a more farsighted
Designer is more effective in building efficient networks. Thus, a participant’s degree of farsightedness is
expected to positively influence the frequency of equilibrium networks among his designed networks.
Hypothesis 3 Designers who are more farsighted build the equilibrium networks significantly more often
than Designers who are less farsighted.
4 See

Appendix A for the formal definition of the payoff function.
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2.3

Experimental Procedure

Our experiment was conducted in the Business and Economic Research Laboratory (henceforth BaER-Lab)
at Paderborn University in February 2017, where it is possible to control potentially confounding factors
and observe the network structures without measurement problems (Falk and Kosfeld, 2012). We use the
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and invite the participating subjects through the online recruitment
system Orsee (Greiner, 2015) from a pool of approx. 2,800 voluntary students of Paderborn University from
different fields of studies who are enrolled as prospective participants in economic experiments. Subjects
are only allowed to participate in one session. Upon arrival each subject is seated randomly at a computer
workplace in a cubicle, each detached from one another. All subjects are told not to communicate during
the session.
The experiment consists of two parts: The first one is the main network formation experiment, as explained in the previous sections; the second is a follow-up questionnaire to gain additional information on the
subjects, in particular on their farsightedness and their risk behaviour. From the MRG, as briefly described
previously we deduct steps of reasoning of the participants and use these as a measure of farsightedness.
The risk behaviour is measured by two risk assessment questions, which are based on the SOEP (German
Socio-Economic Panel Study), and allow us to categorize subjects by their level of risk aversion. Detailed
descriptions of the MRG and the risk assessment questions can be found in Appendix C.
All subjects within a treatment receive the same instructions before the experiment and are informed
about the structure of the experiment and the payoffs associated with designing and attacking the networks.5
The subjects have 15 minutes to read the five pages of instructions on their own. Afterwards, the main points
of the instructions are repeated verbally by the experimentor. Before starting the experiment, all participants
are asked to complete a control questionnaire consisting of five questions about the details of the experiment
to ensure their understanding. At the end of the network formation experiment, one of the participating
subjects is randomly chosen to roll a dice to determine the network position relevant for the final monetary
payment for all subjects. Note that the networks are displayed in random order per group of subjects. This
means that typically the initial networks relevant for the final monetary payments vary among groups. We
set the exchange rate to 1 Euro for 5 Taler and the show-up fee to 5 Euro.6 Each session took about 65
minutes, including time to read the instructions and receiving the payoff. In total, there were 96 subjects
in the experiment. These participants generated an average payment of 13.28 Euro (including 5 Euro as a
show-up fee). In the first treatment, 48 subjects attended with an average payment of 13.90 Euro; in the
second treatment, 48 subjects took part generating an average payment of 12.67 Euro.

3

Results

In this section we present the main findings. Table 2 shows a summary of our data across both treatments,
concerning the age, gender and semester of studies. The majority of subjects (86%) did not have previous
experience with network theory. As our experiment was conducted in German, we did not ask for nationality
because our subject pool consisted of mainly German students. In addition to the general summary statistics,
in Table 2 we also include data on the level of reasoning of the subjects as elicited in the MRG and on the
mean overall risk aversion as elicited in the questionnaire (see Appendix C for further information). For the
mean level or reasoning, we have between 0 and 11 steps, where 11 is very farsighted and 0 is not farsighted
at all. For risk aversion, we have 11 categories between 0 and 10, where 10 is very risk averse and 0 is very
risk loving.
The descriptives in Table 3 concern the networks that our subjects designed in the experiment. It shows
a summary of the networks designed in the two treatments given the different starting networks. Here (a)
to (d) refers to the different initial starting networks as depicted in Figures 2(a) to 2(d). In Table 3 we
summarized which networks were designed, differentiating by their resistance against attacks and by their
architecture. Regarding resistance against attacks, we consider as safe networks those networks that could
not be disconnected by deleting up to two nodes. Correspondingly, unsafe networks are those that could be
disconnected by such an attack. For the distinction by network architecture, the CPS and Minimal 3 refer to
the centre-protected star and the minimal 3-connected network without defence. These two networks are the
5 In the instructions we used the words design and separate a network, to avoid any influence of the more suggestive terms
of attacking a network.
6 We chose this rather high show-up fee, as there was a chance that students did not earn anything in the experiment. This
applied if they did not built a safe network that was then destroyed by their partner and did not destroy their partner’s network
themselves.
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Variable
Male
Mean Age
Mean Semester
Experience Networks
Mean Farsightedness
Mean Risk Aversion

Treatment T1
46%
23.77
5.04
17%
2.83
5.31

Treatment T2
27%
24.56
5.38
10%
3.23
5.58

Total Sample
36%
24.17
5.21
14%
3.03
5.44

Table 2: Summary Statistics

equilibrium networks for treatment T1 and T2, respectively. In addition, we also consider those networks
which were already built disconnected in Phase I by the Designer and denote them as Designed disconnected.
The remaining networks are then summarized as Other networks. Please note that per treatment per starting
network we have 48 observations.
Number of:

Treatment T1
Treatment T2
Starting Network
(a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d)
Total Networks
48
48 48 48
48
48 48 48
Networks by Resistance against Attacks:
Safe Networks
34
30 31 33
28
28 28 27
Unsafe Networks
14
18 17 15
20
20 20 21
Networks by Architecture:
CPS
30
27 30 31
21
17 24 21
Minimal 3
1
0
0
0
5
4
3
3
Designed Disconnected
8
9
10
8
5
4
7
4
Other Networks
9
12
8
9
17
23 14 20
Table 3: Overview of Built Networks
In order to determine whether the share of Designers who built safe networks is significant independent
of starting network, as proposed in Hypothesis 1, we first conduct a χ2 -test to analyse whether the amount
of safe networks built depends on the starting network. For treatment T1 we find a χ2 -statistic of 0.9375; for
treatment T2 we find a χ2 -statistic of 0.0641 and neither is significant at p < 0.05. Therefore, we conclude
that there is no difference between starting networks in the ability of Designers to build safe networks. We
then conduct a Wilcoxon signed rank test to analyse whether a significant share of Designers manages to
build a safe network, independent of starting network. Here we find a z-value of 2.670, which is significant
at p < 0.01. Result 1 follows from this. Support for Result 1 is also provided by Table 3, which presents
the amount of safe networks, and row one of Table 4. In addition, we also see evidence for Result 1 in
the distribution of the observed payoffs per starting network and treatment, which can be found in in
Appendix B.1.
Result 1 A significant share of Designers manages to build a safe network, independent of starting network.
Looking more into detail who managed to design safe networks, a χ2 -test shows, not surprisingly, that the
13 subjects who had experience with network analysis did significantly better than the remaining subjects
in terms of building safe and efficient networks, for p < 0.1 and p < 0.01 respectively.7 Interestingly, the
ability to design safe networks, while not depending on a starting network as such, still does not mean
that a subject who once managed to build a safe network could achieve this in all four of his networks.
Out of the 49 subjects who were able to build at least one safe network, only 51% managed to build all
7 A first observed gender effect in the ability to build safe networks is rescinded, when also taking experience with network
analysis into account.
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four networks as safe. Thus, it seems that some additional strategic thinking by the subjects is required to
transfer the knowledge of how to build a safe network to all possible starting networks. In addition to the
subjects’ experience with networks, we also look at the influence of their risk aversion on the ability to design
safe or safe and efficient networks. We measured risk aversion by means of asking students to self-assess
their risk attitude in two questions at the end of the experiment.8 Using a Jonckheere-Terpstra test we
find no statistically significant relationship between the degree of risk aversion and the underlying observed
behaviour of forming safe (z-value = 0.5665, p > 0.1) or safe and efficient networks (z-value = 0.4335,
p > 0.1).
Number of Subjects who successfully designed (out of 4):
Safe Networks
CPS Networks
Min3 Networks

0
25
24
42

1
6
2
2
∗∗∗
p < 0.01,

2
9
4
1
∗∗
p < 0.05,

3
9
4
1
∗
p < 0.1.

4
47
24
2

Wilcoxon test
z = 2.670∗∗∗
z = −5.088∗∗∗
z = 4.366∗∗∗

Table 4: Safe and Efficient Networks per Subject
Looking at the safe networks per treatment, it can directly be deducted from Table 3 that the CPS is
built more often than the minimal 3-connected network for both treatments. Interestingly, the few times
that subjects managed to design the minimal 3-connected network was in treatment T2, where it was
also efficient to do so (see also Table 5). In order to test whether in treatment T1 the CPS is designed
more frequently than other safe networks and whether in treatment T2 the minimal 3-connected network is
designed more frequently than other safe networks, we conduct a Wilcoxon signed rank test for each of the
two treatments. For treatment T1 we find that among the safe networks the CPS is designed significantly
more often than others with a z-value of −5.088 for a p < 0.01. For treatment T2 we find that among the
safe networks the minimal 3-connected network is not designed more often than other safe networks. Here
the test actually indicates that other safe networks are designed significantly more often than the minimal
3-connected network, with a z-value of 4.366 for p < 0.01. Results 2a and 2b follow from this. Support for
Results 2a and 2b is also provided in rows 2 and 3 of Table 4, respectively.
Result 2a The centre-protected star network is designed significantly more often than others in treatment
T1.
Result 2b The minimal 3-connected network is not designed significantly more often than others in treatment T2.
Since the CPS seems to be the more intuitive solution for most subjects, we also tested whether it was
designed more often in treatment T1, where it was also efficient, than in treatment T2, where it was safe but
not efficient. Here we use a χ2 -test and find that the CPS is designed significantly more often in treatment
T1 than in treatment T2. We also find that the minimal 3-connected network was designed significantly
more often in treatment T2 than in treatment T1. Thus, while it seems to have been difficult for the subjects
to design a minimal 3-connected network, they succeeded to do so significantly more often in the treatment
where it was also the efficient solution. Support for this can be found in Table 5. Additionally, we also
analysed whether our results are robust to taking in account networks that are almost minimal 3-connected
networks.9 Qualitatively the results are in line with the results presented here. Details can be found in
Appendix B.2.
Finally, we also analyse the impact of Designers’ farsightedness on their ability to build equilibrium
networks. Here we use the MRG, as introduced by Arad and Rubinstein (2012), giving us a measure for
the farsightedness of our subjects. Subjects could request an integer amount between 11 and 20 Euro. If
their requested amount was exactly one less than the amount their partner requested, they could get an
additional 20 Euro.10 The distribution of answers in our MRG is remarkably similar to the one found in
8 The

questions and instructions can be found in Appendix C.
are networks where subjects seem to have wanted to design a minimal 3-connected network, but did not quite manage
to do so. The exact definition of these networks can be found in Appendix B.2.
10 After the experiment, in each session a group number was chosen for whom the MRG was actually paid out.
9 These
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Treatment
T1
T2
χ2

CPS Not CPS
Min3 Not Min3
118
74
1
191
83
109
15
177
12.7885∗∗∗
12.7826∗∗∗
∗∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.

Table 5: CPS and Minimal 3-connected Networks per Treatment
Arad and Rubinstein (2012). Most students can be categorized as having level 1-, 2- or 3-reasoning, thus
requesting 19, 18 or 17 Euro.11 After the MRG, we also asked subjects to write down why they chose a
certain amount of money, and by means of their answers we corrected the level k-reasoning deducted from
the MRG.12 We do not find an ascending trend with the Jonckheere-Terpstra test which would support our
hypothesis that subjects who exhibit more farsightedness are more likely to form efficient networks. For this
farsightedness measure we find, however, that there is simply no relation between farsightedness and the
number of efficient networks designed with p = 0.8663 for the ascending trend test and p = 0.1337 for the
descending trend test.13 This insignificant relationship cannot be explained by risk preferences, as we find
no correlation between the measures of farsightedness and risk aversion in our sample (Kendells Tau value
of −0.0680, p-value of 0.3779).
Result 3 The level of Designers’ farsightedness does not concur with their ability to build equilibrium networks.
Additionally, we also look at the subjects’ ability to destroy networks when being in the role of the
Adversary. Each subject in Phase II of the experiment got to attack up to two nodes in the networks his
partner constructed in Phase I. As a lot of the networks had been built in such a way that no successful attack
was possible (see Table 3), only few subjects had the possibility to actually attack a network successfully.
Out of the 384 networks designed in the experiment only 105 networks were destroyable; out of these, 73
were actually destroyed by the Adversary. The remaining 32 networks could have been destroyed by an
attack on two nodes, but the Adversaries were not successful in finding and attacking the weak spots of the
network. We use this as a control to test whether those subjects who were able to destroy a network, if they
had the chance to do so, were also more successful in designing efficient networks. However, we do not find
that this is the case. Using a χ2 -test, we find that there is no significant relation between the ability to build
safe and/or efficient networks and the ability to successfully destroy a network if one has the chance to do
so. It has to be taken into account, though, that overall there were not a lot of subjects who actually had
the chance to destroy networks, therefore this may not be a very accurate measure.

4

Conclusion

In this paper we report results from an experiment in which subjects play a network formation game knowing
that the network will be attacked afterwards. The game is modelled on the theoretical results by Dziubiński
and Goyal (2013). We find that while subjects are overall able to build networks that are safe against the
subsequent attack, independent of their starting network, they only manage to build efficient networks in
treatment T1, where the efficient network is the centre-protected star. In treatment T2, where the efficient
network is a minimal 3-connected network, the large majority of subjects failed to design this network.
However, we show that those subjects who do manage to design a minimal 3-connected network do so in
treatment T2, where it is also the efficient network.
Interestingly, in contrast to previous, often decentralised network formation experiments, we do not find
that more symmetric networks are built more often (see, for example, Falk and Kosfeld 2012). On the
11 Interestingly, among our 48 groups, there were 8 groups in which one person requested exactly 1 Euro less than the other
person. In these groups the lower requesting partner requested 18 Euro in most cases, 17 Euro in one case and 16 Euro in one
case.
12 Thus, for example, people requesting 13 Euro, who report that they did this because the 13th is their birthday, are put to
level 0-reasoning instead of the level 7-reasoning they are coded as in the pure MRG.
13 Looking at the values of the pure MRG, we find that there is actually a negative relationship between level k-reasoning and
the ability to build safe and efficient networks. This can be seen from the results of the Jonckheere-Terpstra test, which has a
p-value of 0.9791 when testing for an ascending trend between subjects’ farsightedness and the number of equilibrium networks
they designed. Instead, we find a significant descending trend for the variables, with p < 0.05.
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contrary, we find that network Designers tend to build the (centre-protected) star network significantly more
often than the more symmetric minimal 3-connected network. It seems that while in decentralized models of
network formation the asymmetric payoffs to the centre and the spokes of the star prevent this network from
being built, in a centralized model the (centre-protected) star is the most intuitive solution. The minimal
3-connected network, on the other hand, seems to be too complicated for the majority of subjects to be
built. This is surprising, as it can be designed as a very symmetric network.
We find that farsightedness, as measured by the MRG, does not predict well which subjects build efficient and safe networks. While we find that students with any kind of experience with network theory
do significantly better than their inexperienced counterparts, we neither find significant differences in other
personality characteristics such as gender nor do we find that the degree of risk aversion is related with
building efficient and safe networks.
Overall, it seems to be the case that subjects are in principal able to understand the network formation
game and manage to build safe networks. However, for some cost structures building efficient networks is
already too complex in an environment where a network consists of only eight nodes and payoffs are calculated
on-the-fly for the subjects while designing the network. Additionally, subjects have ample time to try out
different designs and can also go back to change their previously made designs, but still in treatment T2,
most of them fail to reach a minimal 3-connected network. Also, only approximately half of those subjects
who build at least one safe network manage to build safe networks for all four starting networks. Thus,
there seems to be an additional complexity involved in transferring the way to build a safe network from
one starting network to another. However, these complexities can be overcome by using more experienced
subjects, as can be seen from our finding that subjects with any sort of former introduction to network
theory did significantly better.
One possible extension of the current analysis is motivated by Landwehr (2015), who studies network
formation behaviour in case of imperfect node as well as link defence. By that, he extends the model of
Dziubiński and Goyal (2013), who only considered perfect defence as protection against node attacks. Here
the predicted equilibrium networks change and, due to the increased complexity of the model, the set of
networks gets less symmetric. It would be interesting to test in an experiment if subjects are still able to
build these new equilibrium networks, even with this increased complexity. To test this, a new experiment is
needed, as networks consisting of 8 nodes would probably be already too much of a challenge for the subjects
and the parameters for equilibrium networks also need to be adjusted.
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Dziubiński M, Goyal S (2017) How do you defend a network? Theoretical Economics 12(1):331–376
Falk A, Kosfeld M (2012) It’s all about connections: Evidence on network formation. Review of Network
Economics 11(3):Article 2
Fischbacher U (2007) z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental Economics
10(2):171–178
Goeree JK, Riedl A, Ule A (2009) In search of stars: Network formation among heterogeneous agents. Games
and Economic Behavior 67(2):445–466
Goyal S, Vigier A (2014) Attack, defence, and contagion in networks. Review of Economic Studies 81(4):1518–
1542
Goyal S, Jabbari S, Kearns M, Khanna S, Morgenstern J (2016) Strategic network formation with attack
and immunization. In: Cai Y, Vetta A (eds) Web and Internet Economics. WINE 2016. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, vol 10123
Greiner B (2015) Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with ORSEE. Journal of the
Economic Science Association 1(1):114–125
Haller H (2016) Network vulnerability: A designer-disruptor game. Working Paper Series Virginia Polytech
Institute and State University, Department of Economics e07-50
Harrison GW, Rutström EE (2008) Risk aversion in the laboratory. In: Risk Aversion in Experiments,
Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp 41–196
Hoyer B, De Jaegher K (2012) Cooperation and the common enemy effect. Discussion Paper Series/Tjalling
C Koopmans Research Institute 12(24)
Hoyer B, De Jaegher K (2016) Strategic network disruption and defense. Journal of Public Economic Theory
18(5):802–830
Hoyer B, Rosenkranz S (2015) Farsightedness and risk in network formation - an experiment, mimeo
Jackson MO, Wolinsky A (1996) A strategic model of social and economic networks. Journal of Economic
Theory 71(1):44–74
Kirchsteiger G, Mantovani M, Mauleon A, Vannetelbosch V (2016) Limited farsightedness in network formation. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 128:97–120
Kovenock DJ, Roberson B (2015) The Optimal Defense of Network Connectivity. CESifo Working Paper
Series 5653, CESifo Group Munich
Landwehr J (2015) On the emergence of networks. PhD thesis, University Bielefeld
Morbitzer D, Buskens V, Rauhut H, Rosenkranz S (2012) Limited farsightedness in network formation
experiment, mimeo
Pelliccia M (2015) Decentralised defence of a (directed) network structure, Working Paper, Birkbeck College,
University of London, UK
TNS Infratest Sozialforschung (2014) SOEP 2014. Erhebungsinstrumente 2014 (Welle 31) des Sozioökonomischen Panels: Personenfragebogen, Altstichproben. DIW/SOEP: SOEP Survey Papers 235: Series
A

Brangewitz, Djawadi, Endres, Hoyer:
Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment

13

Appendix
A

Theory

The sequential game has two players: a Designer and an Adversary. The Designer makes his decision during
the first phase and then the Adversary decides.
In the first phase, the Designer chooses a strategy to build and protect a network for a fixed set of n
nodes (n ≥ 3). In other words, the Designer decides which nodes he links at a constant and exogenously
given cost c` , with c` > 0 and which nodes he protects at an exogenously given cost cd , with cd > 0. A
protected node cannot be removed from the network by an attack of the Adversary. We denote the strategy
which the Designer has chosen by the pair (g, δ), which consists of the network g described by a set of links
and the set of protected nodes by δ.14
In the second phase, the Adversary sees the designed and protected networks and decides which nodes
to attack. If the Adversary decides to attack a node that is not protected, this node and all its links are
removed from the network. If the node is protected, the Adversary’s attack has no impact on the network.
Let ka > 0 denote the maximal number of attacks the Adversary is allowed to choose. Attacks are assumed
to be costless. Let the (sub)set of nodes that the Adversary chooses to attack be denoted by X. The final
network after the attack is called the residual network. It is connected if every pair of nodes either directly
has a link between them, or if they are indirectly linked via other nodes. A network which is not connected
is disconnected.
The payoffs are as follows
(
vD − |δ| · cd − |g| · c` if the residual network is connected,
D
π (g, δ, X) =
0
if the residual network is not connected.
(
0
if the residual network is connected,
π A (g, δ, X) =
vA if the residual network is not connected.
with vD , vA > 0. The parameters vD and vA indicate the value of the residual network.15 Intuitively, as
long as the costs for links and protection are not too high, it is the Designer’s goal to design a network at
minimum costs that cannot be attacked by the Adversary, while the goal of the Adversary is to destroy the
Designer’s network.
Proposition 1 (see Dziubiński and Goyal, 2013) Assume ka ≤ n − 2.
In equilibrium the Designer builds a protected network (g, δ) such that
m
l
m

l
– for c` < vD / n(ka2+1) and cd > c` n(ka2−1) + 1 it is a minimal (ka + 1)-connected network,
l
m

– for c` (n − 1) + cd < vD and cd < c` n(ka2−1) + 1 it is a centre-protected star network,
– otherwise g is the empty network and no node is protected, δ = ∅.
In equilibrium, the Adversary chooses -if possible- a set such that the network is no longer connected
and, if it is not possible to disconnected the network, any set of nodes yields the same payoff.
Important underlying assumptions in this model are the perfect information about the network, its
structure and its characteristics such as the cost structure and the player’s objectives and payoffs. Moreover,
the defence of nodes is perfect. Thus, unprotected nodes are removed with certainty after an attack and a
protected node remains in the network even after being targeted. Regarding the attack, it is assumed that
the Adversary’s budget is exogenously given. In addition, the Adversary’s budget is perfectly known by the
Designer and the Adversary attacks the network optimally given that he observes the designed network.
14 Formally, given a finite set of nodes N = {1, ..., n} with n ≥ 3, a network g is a set of links, i.e., g ⊆ {{i, j}|i, j ∈ N, i 6= j}
and a set of protected nodes is a (sub)set of nodes, i.e., δ ⊆ N .
15 For scaling purposes in the experimental design we model the utility functions here such that the values v
D and vA are not
necessarily identical. Note that in the model of Dziubiński and Goyal (2013), these values were supposed to be identical and
for the formal analysis set to be equal to 1. Formally, the values of the residual network are a mapping associating to every
possible residual network a value for the Designer and for the Adversary. For notational simplification, we omit this dependence
on the residual network here.
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B
B.1

Experimental Results
Observed Payoffs

Frequency

Figures 6 and 7 show the observed payoffs of the Designer after the attack of the Adversary in Phase II.
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Figure 6: Observed Payoffs for Treatment T1 by Starting Network
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Figure 7: Observed Payoffs for Treatment T2 by Starting Network
Note that the payoff from the theoretical predictions for treatment T1 is equal to 45 Taler for the centreprotected star network and for treatment T2 this is 40 Taler for the minimal 3-connected network. The
payoff for the centre-protected star network in treatment T2 is 35 Taler and the payoff is zero whenever the
network was successfully disconnected by the Adversary (or already disconnected before the attack) or all
the budget was used to build the network. Payoffs larger than the equilibrium payoffs indicate that while
the network could have been disconnected during the attack, the Adversary did not manage to do so.

B.2

Robustness

As the minimal 3-connected network seems to have been a less intuitive network to design for the subjects,
as a robustness check we analyse whether our results are affected if we assume that those networks where
subjects managed to build almost minimal 3-connected networks are analysed as minimal 3-connected. The
reason for this is that there are a number of networks where it seems that subjects tried to build a minimal
3-connected network, but failed in achieving this and added one or two additional links to the network.
Therefore, we defined networks to be almost minimal 3-connected when they are safe against disruption,
each node has at least 3 links, no protection is used, and maximally 14 links are used in the network. Using
this definition, we find 7 networks that are almost minimal 3-connected.16 Adding the almost minimal
3-connected to the minimal 3-connected and replicating Table 5, we obtain Table 6.
16 That our reasoning seems to hold can also be deduced from the fact that there are no almost minimal 3-connected networks
for starting network 1, which is the empty network. Since no links were previously given in this network, everyone who wanted
to build a minimal 3-connected network also managed to do so.
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Treatment
T1
T2
χ2

CPS Not CPS
118
74
83
109
12.7885∗∗∗
∗∗∗
p < 0.01,

(Almost) Min3 Not (almost) Min3
2
190
21
171
16.6957∗∗∗
∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.

Table 6: CPS and (almost) Minimal 3-connected Networks per Treatment
It can be seen from Table 6 that those subjects that build almost minimal 3-connected networks do so in
treatment T2, where the minimal 3-connected network was also the efficient solution. Henceforth, we briefly
present this model in an already slightly adapted version to our experimental design. For a comprehensive
description and analysis of the underlying theoretical model we refer to Dziubiński and Goyal (2013).

C

Questionnaires to Elicit Further Information

Money Request Game (see Arad and Rubinstein, 2012). The Money Request Game (henceforth
MRG) is rested on level-k models, which assume that persons can be clustered into different groups regarding
their depth of reasoning. For example, a level-0 type person would act non-strategically and thinks no step
ahead of his own behaviour. In our version of the MRG, the participants are matched in groups of two
and have to choose an amount between 11 and 20 Euro, which they get paid at the end. They have the
opportunity to additionally gain 20 Euro if their chosen amount is exactly 1 Euro less than the partner’s
requested amount, which is supposed to encourage to think about the partner’s strategy. This enables us to
categorize participants by different levels of reasoning, corresponding to the number they state in the game.
After the participants stated their amount, they are asked to explain their numeric decision. At the end,
one of the groups gets randomly chosen to be paid their stated amounts from the game. You may find the
English translation of the instructions you may find in Appendix D.2.
Questionnaire Including Risk Assessment. The final part of the experiment is a personal questionnaire. The questionnaire aims at gaining insights about the subjects’ personal characteristics as well as their
strategic behaviour: Thus, their network formation and network disruption strategies are asked. By means
of this information, we are able to better understand their decision-making process and see if the subjects
formed their networks randomly or according to a specific strategy. Moreover, it is asked if they have had
any experience with network theory. This would be likely to improve their understanding and their results
in the network formation and attacking process.
Generally, it is uncontroversial that the participants’ risk attitude influences their decisions within an
experiment (Dohmen et al, 2010, Harrison and Rutström, 2008). Thus, we include two questions into the
questionnaire in which the participants have to self-assess their risk behaviour in certain situations. The risk
assessment questions are based on the SOEP (German Socio-Economic Panel Study), which is a large panel
dataset with the aim to represent the German population introduced by a professional surveying company.
Since the SOEP is very extensive and includes a large spread of issues, we chose just questions 4 and 125
from the panel in the year 2014, which both aim specifically at the participants’ risk attitudes (TNS Infratest
Sozialforschung 2014). The first question is an all-around measure of the participants willingness to take
risks in general. Hence, this first question asks participants if they are rather risk averse or not. Since average
willingness to take risks varies across contexts, the second question deals with risk in specific contexts: It is
asked about their risk behaviour in financial issues, at driving, in sports and leisure, on the job, regarding
their personal health status, and regarding trusting unknown persons. For both questions, participants can
choose values on a scale from 0 to 10, whereas 0 means “not willing to take risk at all”, and 10 means “very
willing to take risk”. We choose these questions because they suit our purpose to collect information about
the participants’ risk attitudes in a simple way. Moreover, the second, more detailed question serves to rule
out potential inconsistencies in self-estimation and is a direct measurement of the participants’ risk attitudes
and the inexpensiveness to collect the information (Dohmen et al, 2011). Besides, Dohmen et al (2011)
confirm these questions to be a fit measurement of subjects’ risk self-assessment by conducting a mixture of
experiment and survey and use the survey to validate the participants’ risk attitudes measured in the earlier
conducted experiment.
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D

Instructions (English Version)

The version of the instructions presented in this section is a translation of the original instructions written
in German. Variations between the two treatments are indicated in square brackets. The instructions for
the MRG are close to the ones of Arad and Rubinstein (2012).

D.1

Experiment Instructions

General information
• During the experiment all payments are stated in the fictitious currency “Taler”.
• After the experiment we would like to ask you to fill out a questionnaire. For this you will receive a
short instruction as soon as the experiment has ended.
• In addition to the instructions you also receive a separate explanation of the computer screen.

Structure of the experiment
• This experiment consists of two phases: Phase I and Phase II.
• The experiment is about networks. Examples for networks are electricity networks, transport systems,
communication systems and oil pipelines.
• A network is displayed in this experiment by points and links between these points.
• A network is said to be connected
– if all existing points form one network; this means that each point has a link to at least one of
the other points and that in a connected network there are no points without any links and there
are no separate sub-networks.
• A network is disconnected
– if there is at least one point in the network that is not connected by a link to the other points.
This implies that the network is disconnected if the existing network is separated into several
sub-networks or single points are isolated.
• The next figure (schematically) shows examples for connected and disconnected networks:

Example connected
network

Example
disconnected network (with
two sub networks)

Example
disconnected network with
one sub-network and
three isolated points

Course of the experiment
Phase I (design networks)
• For Phase I (design networks) you have 15 minutes (900 seconds).
• Initially, you see four networks in which in some there are already existing links.
• Every network shall be considered separately and independent of the other networks.
• The network currently chosen to work on is marked by a green frame on the computer screen (see
separate explanation of the computer screen).
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Your task is to design in total four networks for the four initial starting networks.
Note that in Phase II (remove points) of the experiment a different participant may remove two
points from each of your networks.
Your payment per network is dependent on the connectedness of the network after Phase II.
• You have two possibilities when designing your networks: You may establish links or protect points.
You cannot protect links.
• Establishing links and protecting points is costly:
– Establishing a link between two points costs 5 Taler.
– Protecting a point costs 20 Taler [for treatment T2 protecting points costs 30 Taler].
At most you can spend 100 Taler per network. This means that you cannot establish infinitely many
links and/or protect all points.
• The additional links may be established between two points for which there is no initial link. Initial
links cannot be deleted and the costs for these links are deduced from your budget.
• All points may be protected. Protected points are marked by a square around the point.
• You cannot add additional points. All existing points need to be included in the network, otherwise
the network counts as disconnected.
• After the design is finished, you are asked to click on “Continue” to proceed with the experiment.
Phase II (remove points)
• For Phase II (remove points) you have 5 minutes (300 seconds).
• You see four networks of another participant. You see them as they have been designed by the
other participant in Phase I.
• Every network shall be considered separately and independent of the other networks.
Your task is to remove up to two points from each of the four networks .
• If you decide to remove a protected point, this has no impact on the network. Neither the
protection nor the point itself will be removed.
• If you decide to remove an unprotected point, this point and all its adjacent links will be
removed. The network is reduced by this point, but may not necessarily be disconnected.
As long as all remaining points are connected with at least one link, the network remains
connected with a smaller number of points.
Your payment per network is dependent on the connectedness the network of the other participant after Phase II.
• Links can only be removed indirectly together with unprotected points. Links cannot be removed
separately from the network.
• The decision to remove protected and/or unprotected points has no costs.

→

Connected network
after Phase I

→

Unprotected
point
for removal selected

Disconnected
network after Phase II
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Payments
• Your payment consists of two parts: You receive a payment for one of the networks that you designed
in Phase I and for one of the networks from which you removed points in Phase II.
• The payment-relevant network is determined after the experiment by means of one randomly chosen
participant rolling a dice.
• For the payment only the remaining networks after Phase II are going to be considered.
• The payment of the networks depends on the related task.
– For the networks you designed (Phase I), you receive a potential payment for connected networks.
This means that if after Phase II a network is
– disconnected, your potential payment for this network is 0 Taler. You are charged no costs
for the links and protection of points.
– connected, your potential payment for this network is 100 Taler less the costs for the established links, the initial links and the protected points.
– For networks in which you removed points (Phase II), you receive a potential payment for disconnected networks. This means that if after Phase II one of the networks in which you removed
points is
– disconnected, your potential payment for this network is 20 Taler.
– connected, your potential payment for this network is 0 Taler.
• The currency Taler will be converted with an exchange rate of 2.00 Euro per 10 Taler. The payment
is paid in cash together with a show-up fee of 5.00 Euro.
Examples for the payment
Example 1
after Phase I

after Phase II

Number of links: 7
Number of protected points: 1
Costs: 35 Taler + 20 Taler = 55 Taler
Number of removed points: 2
Status of the network: connected
Payment for the network designer:
100 Taler – 55 Taler = 45 Taler
Payment for the point-remover: 0 Taler

Example 2
after Phase I

after Phase II

Number of links: 9
Number of protected points: 0
Costs: 45 Taler
Number of removed points: 1
Status of the network: connected
Payment for the network designer:
100 Taler – 45 Taler = 55 Taler
Payment for the point-remover: 0 Taler

Example 3
after Phase I

after Phase II

Number of links: 5
Number of protected points: 0
Costs: 25 Taler
Number of removed points: 0
Status of the network: disconnected
Payment for the network designer: 0 Taler
Payment for the point-remover: 20 Taler

[Please note, for T2 the costs for protection are 30 Taler, and the calculations change accordingly.]
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Please note:
• During the entire experiment, any and all forms of communication is not permitted.
• All mobile phones must be switched off during the entire duration of the experiment.
• The decisions you make within this experiment are anonymous: i.e., none of the other participants
gets to know the identity of a person who has made a specific decision.
• Please remain seated until the end of the experiment. You will be called forward for your payment by
your seat number.

Good luck and thank you very much for your participation in this experiment!
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D.2

Instructions Money Request Game

The experiment is over now. We proceed with the questionnaire.

Instructions questionnaire part 1:
• In part 1 of the questionnaire, we would like to know how you decide when you have the possibility to
request an amount of money.
• More precisely, you are in the following situation:
“You and another participant play a game, in which you request an amount of money. The
amount of money needs to be an integer between 11 and 20 Euro. You may only select
numbers in steps of 1. You and the other participant will receive the amount requested. One
of you will receive an additional 20 Euro if he asks for exactly one Euro less than the other
participant. What amount of money do you request?”
• Thus, you may chose a number and enter this number in the display box.
• Afterwards, you will be asked to explain your decision.
Additional profit opportunity in part 1 of the questionnaire:
• In the first part of the questionnaire you have another chance to win a payment.
• For this, one group of two participants in this room will be drawn randomly.
• The group will be selected by chance: A random participant will draw one of the group numbers.
• The number which was drawn will be passed through the room silently, in order for all participants to
see the number.
• You will be informed on the computer screen about your group and whether you have won.
• The selected group receives the additional payment, one of them potentially the additional 20 Euro
and the payment for the main experiment after the completion of the final part of the questionnaire.
Upon the completion of the first part of the questionnaire by all participants, part 2 will follow. The answers
in part 2 are irrelevant for the payment.
All questions will be evaluated anonymously and communication is not allowed during the complete experiment.
Thank you very much for the participation in this experiment!

č

